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Abstract: This article examines the economic and social transformation oc-
curring in post-communist societies, with a particular focus on the emer-
gence of new social risks (NSRs) and the subsequent welfare state responses. 
It argues that Central and Eastern European countries are characterised by 
broader NSR types (a mix of old and new social risks) and groups than those 
present in the West. In order to deal more effectively with the requirements of 
the post-industrial, knowledge-based, and service economy, the reasons for a 
new political economy of skill formation and for a new empowering politics 
of the welfare state capable of strengthening the potential of individuals to 
adapt to more ﬂ exible labour markets are discussed. The new empowering 
politics of the welfare state proposed here would consist of four main pillars: 
1) a guaranteed minimum income; 2) a basic income for children; 3) state in-
vestments for education and human capital formation; and 4) a guaranteed 
basic pension. The aim is to empower the individual through de-commodiﬁ -
cation, childhood investment, human capital formation, and a rebalancing of 
life risks. The article concludes by reﬂ ecting on the political feasibility of this 
proposal.
Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, social change, welfare state reforms, 
new social risks, new political economy of skill formation, new empowering 
politics of the welfare state
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Introduction
Contemporary European societies are undergoing a process of drastic transfor-
mation, involving a functional, distributive, normative, and institutional recali-
bration1 [Hemerijck 2008] of the welfare architecture introduced during the trente 
glorieuses of the welfare state (the period from the 1950s to 1970s). In Central and 
Eastern Europe, this transformation is even more dramatic owing to the difﬁ cult 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Institutional 
restructuring associated with radical demographic changes, de-industrialisation, 
and transition to a post-industrial, knowledge-based, and service economy [Lid-
dle and Lerais 2007] are resulting in more severe adaptations of the main political, 
economic, and social values. In the political sphere, the new principles involve 
the acceptance of democracy as ‘the only game in town’ [Linz and Stepan 1996: 5], 
in the economic sphere, the monetisation of economic relations (citizens are now 
seen as consumers), and, in the social sphere, the individualisation of responsi-
bilities. New and more diversiﬁ ed social risks are emerging as a consequence.
The literature on new social risks (NSRs) has so far been concerned with 
Western European countries. A number of authors have identiﬁ ed the principal 
factors for the emergence of NSRs as the de-industrialisation and tertiarisation of 
employment, women’s entry into the labour market, the increasing instability of 
the family structure, and processes linked to the privatisation of the welfare state 
[Esping-Andersen 1999; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; Taylor-Gooby 2004; Armin-
geon and Bonoli 2006]. Can such factors, developed for the West, be applied in toto 
to Eastern Europe, too? Whereas during communism the main risks that Eastern 
European citizens faced were primarily related to the possibility of not ﬁ nding 
necessary consumables in the shops owing to the ‘economy of shortage’ [Kornai 
1992] or dealing with poor or bad quality social services, in the post-communist 
environment the spectrum of ‘new’ social risks is substantially broader. NSRs 
include, for example, balancing paid work with family responsibilities, care for 
elderly parents, and having a lack of (or obsolete) skills in the labour market as 
identiﬁ ed for the West. Additionally in Eastern European countries there are the 
added NSRs of no longer having access to a secure job, a pension, health care, or 
a minimum income.
The main argument put forward in this article is that Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries are characterised by broader NSR types and groups, 
and that this societal transformation calls for a new political economy of skill 
formation [see Vanhuysse 2008a] associated with a new empowering politics of 
the welfare state, different from the one introduced during the ﬁ rst years of tran-
1 The concepts of functional, distributive, normative, and institutional recalibration were 
ﬁ rst introduced by Ferrera et al. [2000], Pierson [2001], and Hemerijck [2008], to describe 
the changes that contemporary welfare systems are facing. According to the authors, not 
only an institutional recalibration is taking place in Western welfare states but also a recali-
bration of the main welfare functions, aspects of distribution, and basic norms.
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sition. The new phase of social modernisation stemming from the fast entry into 
the knowledge-based economy necessitates, in fact, a drastic change in policy 
instruments2 and political discourses. From status-maintenance policies (the ‘old 
politics of the welfare state’) or cost-containment policies (the traditional ‘new 
politics of the welfare state’ according to Pierson [2001]), the welfare state in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe is now asked to increase its productive function so as to 
improve its social investment and empowerment capacities. 
In order to substantiate this argument, the ﬁ rst part of the article examines 
several secondary statistics provided by the Eurostat describing the main social 
changes occurring in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The second part brieﬂ y dis-
cusses the emergence of NSRs and the subsequent responses from the welfare 
state. Finally, the third part, drawing on the most recent debates on ‘skill produc-
tion regimes’ [see Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005; 
Iversen and Stephens 2008; Vanhuysse 2008a] and on the ‘social investment state’ 
[Esping-Andersen and Palier 2008; Hemerijck 2008], highlights the priorities for a 
new political economy of skill formation, the core elements of a new empowering 
politics of the welfare state, and the political feasibility of this proposal.
Social change and the transformation of the social structure in Central 
and Eastern Europe
Below, the three main social trends of the transition towards a post-industri-
al, knowledge-based service economy are brieﬂ y highlighted. These include: 
1) changes in the labour structure and in employment relations; 2) demographic 
changes and changes in family and household composition; and 3) the individual-
isation of responsibilities and the monetisation of economic and social relations.
The labour structure and employment relations
As far as the changes in the labour structure are concerned, these have primarily 
involved: i) an increase in the number of unemployed owing to the dismissal 
of workers in numerous state-owned enterprises; ii) an increase in employment 
(and in self-employment) in the private sector owing to the privatisation of the 
centrally planned economy; iii) a drastic decrease in the number of people work-
ing in the agricultural and industrial sector only in part covered by an increase 
in the number of those employed in the service sector; iv) the formation of a new 
managerial elite (class), formed, however, in large part by previous administra-
tors and technocrats [Eyal et al. 1998]; and v) the emergence of a new middle 
2 On the concept of policy instruments, see the special issue of governance edited by Las-
coumes and Le Galès [2007].
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class, including self-employed people who work in their own enterprises, white-
collar workers and intellectuals [György and Róbert 2003]. 
A more in-depth comparison of employment patterns, as demonstrated by 
the occupational organisation, shows that CEE societies are now slowly coming 
closer to the occupational structure of Western countries, though some differ-
ences persist. As Table 1 shows, employment in the service sector, though it now 
accounts for the largest share of employment in all countries, is still far from the 
EU-15 average (73%), ranging, with the exception of Romania at 34%, between 
50% and 60% of the total workforce. The percentages of workers employed in 
industry, even though drastically diminished since the ﬁ rst years of transition, 
remains above the EU-15 average (24%). This is particularly true for the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, where more than one-third of 
the total workforce is still employed in industry. Also, the percentages of workers 
employed in the agricultural sector tend to differ from the average of the oldest 
Western member states (4%). In this sector, however, there is signiﬁ cant variance 
within Eastern Europe. The percentages of agricultural workers range from 4% in 
the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia to 36% in the case of Romania.3 
Changes in the labour structure have also resulted in changes in employ-
ment relations and in particular in: a) the dismissal of life-long employment sta-
3 Please note that the differences in the number of employees in the agricultural sector 
depend, to a large extent, on the structural differences in employment that existed during 
communism.
Table 1. Employment by sector (2006)
Industry Agriculture Services
Bulgaria 27.6 20.6 51.8
Czech Rep. 37.6 3.7 58.7
Estonia 33.1 4.9 62.0
Hungary 32.3 4.8 63.0
Latvia 27.0 11.5 61.5
Lithuania 29.5 12.4 58.1
Poland 26.9 19.2 53.9
Romania 30.0 36.0 34.0
Slovakia 33.8 3.6 62.7
Slovenia 35.1 9.7 55.3
EU 15 23.7 3.7 72.6
Source: DG Employment and Social Affairs [2007: 284-315].
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tus; b) the alteration of the relationship between work performance versus work 
remuneration; and c) the establishment of new wage gaps. Table 2 shows how the 
employment ratio (the number of employed as a percentage of the population 
aged 15–59) has decreased in all CEE countries since the ﬁ rst years of the transi-
tion, and, with the exception of Slovenia, is still quite far from the level it was at 
in 1989. Despite recent economic improvements, real wages (an individual’s in-
come after taking into consideration the effects of inﬂ ation on purchasing power) 
have only recently come close to, or surpassed, the level they were at in 1989. The 
intensity of the increase in real wages has been higher in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Romania, and lower in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, 
where they still correspond to between 50% and 80% of the value they were at in 
1989 (see Table 2). 
In order to have a clearer picture of the differences that exist between East 
and West, a more detailed analysis of the main groups affected by unemploy-
ment is necessary. Table 3 presents interesting results. The total unemployment 
rate, below the EU-15 average in almost all CEE countries, is still higher in Poland 
and Slovakia. Similar considerations apply to female, youth, and long-term un-
employment, where Poland, Romania, and Slovakia usually stand apart as late-
comers. Interesting differences between old and new EU member states exist. In 
Central and Eastern Europe those citizens who have only primary or basic educa-
Table 2. Employment and wages
Employment ratio* Real wages**
1989 2004 1989 2004
Bulgaria 82 59 100 55
Czech Rep. 87 70 100 137
Estonia 88 71 100 92
Hungary 83 61 100 115
Latvia .. 70 100 84
Lithuania 84 67 100 66
Romania 77 65 100 120
Poland 75 55 100 91
Slovakia 80 60 100 87
Slovenia 75 73 100 95
EU 15 62 65 .. ..
* Employment ratio (number of employed as a percentage of the population aged 15–59). 
** Real wages (index, base year = 100).
Source: TransMonee Database [2008]; Eurostat [2008]; long-term indicators 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/.
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tion are clearly more at risk of unemployment than Western citizens with similar 
educational attainment.
In addition to the wage gaps that exist between people employed in different 
occupational sectors and between people of different ages and education levels, 
there are also wage differences between men and women (the often cited ‘gender 
wage gap’). Once almost non-existent in the region, these wage differences have 
drastically increased (even though they are still smaller than in most EU member 
states) [European Commission 2006], with women now facing new forms of gen-
der segregation. This is occurring particularly in Southern European countries 
(Bulgaria and Romania) and in the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), but 
also in two Visegrád countries (Poland and Slovakia).
Demographic changes
Demographic changes have also been inﬂ uenced by the transition, although not 
in their totality. The decrease in fertility rates coupled with an increase in the 
number of elderly is slowly resulting in a worsening of the overall dependency 
ratio with clear consequences for the sustainability of post-communist welfare in-
stitutions. The traditional patterns of family formation are also changing. Couples 
in the region are marrying less and less and the number of children is decreasing, 
while the divorce rates are growing in almost all countries. These demographic 
Table 3. Unemployment rates (2007)
Total Female 15–24 years Long-term Primary education (2004)
Bulgaria 6.9 7.3 15.1 4.1 19.8
Czech Rep. 5.3 6.7 10.7 2.8 22.8
Estonia 4.7 3.9 10.0 2.3 15.9
Hungary 7.4 7.7 18.0 3.4 11.0
Latvia 6.0 5.6 10.7 1.6 13.7
Lithuania 4.3 4.3 8.2 1.4 14.0
Poland 9.6 10.4 21.7 4.9 28.4
Romania 6.4 5.4 20.1 3.2 7.2
Slovakia 11.1 12.7 20.3 8.3 48.3
Slovenia 4.9 5.9 10.1 2.2 9.0
EU 15 7.0 7.8 14.7 2.8 10.1
Source: Eurostat [2008] Structural Indicators. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/.
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changes, which to a certain extent are similar to those that have been occurring in 
the West since the 1970s,4 require new forms of social protection, which cannot be 
linked to a relatively stable, dual-earner, life-long employed family that existed 
during communism. 
With regard to the major changes that are occurring in the family and in 
household composition, they primarily entail increasing poverty for: i) single-
headed households; ii) single parents with children; iii) the young; iv) households 
with unemployed, part-time, or atypical workers; and v) households of the Roma 
minority [for a more detailed overview, see World Bank 2005; Cerami 2006]. For 
these groups of people extreme poverty still represents a major and unresolved 
problem. As shown in Table 5, different groups of citizens are covered differently 
by existing welfare institutions. Women are more at risk of poverty in Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, young people in Latvia and Lithuania, 
single people in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, while single 
people with children are more at risk in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The elderly, by contrast, compared to most of the 
oldest EU member states, seem to be relatively well-off, especially in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. 
4 Some country and region speciﬁ cs exist. These include, for example, the bigger decrease 
in fertility rates and marriages since the transition or the more stable low divorce rates of 
Catholic Poland.
Table 5.  At-risk-of-poverty after social transfers (2006) – 60% of median income 
threshold
Total Female Less than 25 years
65 years 
and over
Single 
person
Single with 
children
Bulgaria 14 16 17 18 33 31
Czech Rep. 10 11 13 6 17 41
Estonia 18 20 18 25 42 41
Hungary 16 16 16 9 18 39
Latvia 23 25 21 30 55 40
Lithuania 20 20 21 22 38 44
Poland 19 19 19 8 16 32
Romania 19 19 17 19 27 27
Slovakia 12 12 12 8 17 29
Slovenia 12 13 9 20 43 22
EU 15 16 17 20 20 24 32
Source: Eurostat [2008]. Structural Indicators. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/.
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Poverty, however, is not the only negative outcome, as social segregation is 
also on the increase [see Böhnke 2005; Fahey et al. 2005], with a higher number 
of family members from those categories now formally excluded from normal 
activities that were once available to the society at large (such as access to cultural 
events). In addition, CEE societies are now characterised by more pronounced 
forms of social reproduction of inequalities and of intergenerational transmission 
of poverty than those that existed during communism [Domański 2005; Keller 
2005; Proﬁ t 2005a, 2005b]. Even though, as has often been highlighted, ‘children 
of disadvantaged class origins have to display far more merit than do children 
of more advantaged origins in order to attain similar class positions’ [Breen and 
Goldthorpe 1999: 21], the patterns of class reproduction are now much stronger 
than those that existed before. 
The individualisation of responsibilities and monetisation of economic and social 
relations
The individualisation of responsibilities and the monetisation of economic and 
social relations should be mentioned as further key aspects of the social change 
occurring in post-communist societies. During communism, public responsibil-
ity was the main principle regulating all of social life. With the introduction of 
the market economy things changed and, unfortunately, not always for the better. 
If, on the one hand, individualisation in the management of social life has given 
citizens more power to run their own future, then, on the other hand, the eco-
nomic crisis following the transition has drastically limited the possibilities of the 
individual’s real success. Moreover, a ‘recommodiﬁ cation of risks’ is also taking 
place in Eastern societies. Employers are increasingly responding to the volatility 
of labour, capital, and commodities by transferring market risks to their employ-
ees. In Eastern Europe, this process is likely to have more dramatic consequences 
since citizens have been catapulted into the new reality practically overnight.
Another important feature that has to be mentioned concerns the monetisa-
tion of economic and social relations that is now taking place in post-communist 
societies. The fact that full employment was the rule, that every communist citi-
zen had not only the right but also the obligation to work, and that a wide variety 
of social services (such as health care, housing, holidays, etc.) were organised 
directly by the employer meant that money lost much of its appeal. With the ad-
vent of the market economy, not only are social and economic relations translated 
into clear monetary terms (monetised), but the survival of (former) communist 
citizens is now linked to the successful translation of their skills and work capa-
bilities into marketable goods and services that respond to the ﬂ uctuations of de-
mand from markets and not to the decisions of planners. Needless to say, this is a 
long and very complex process of institutional, cultural, and mental adaptation. 
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 44, No. 6
1098
NSRs and government responses 
The transition from a centrally planned to a market economy coupled with the 
fast transformation of these CEE societies towards post-industrial, knowledge-
based, and service economies has given rise to altogether new risk factors than 
those present during communism. Nowadays, new forms of social exclusion are 
emerging as a result of new and different patterns of poverty and income in-
equality. Uncertain access or entitlement to a pension, health care, employment, 
basic income, family policies, and educational opportunities are also responsible 
for exacerbating a situation already made difﬁ cult by the negative ﬁ nancial con-
sequences of transition. What is important to remember here is that, even though 
these can all be addressed as ‘old’ social risks for Western welfare states, they tend 
to be new in Eastern Europe. However, difﬁ culties in reconciling labour market 
ﬂ exibility with social and economic security, in balancing work and family re-
sponsibilities, and in ensuring care for the elderly, ill, or handicapped parents, the 
‘new’ social risks for Western Europe [Esping-Andersen 1999; Esping-Andersen 
et al. 2002; Taylor-Gooby 2004; Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Häusermann and 
Palier 2007], should also be added to this long list of social challenges. Below, this 
article looks at the emergence of these new and more diversiﬁ ed social risks and 
the associated responses from the welfare state. 
NSRs in Central and Eastern Europe
According to Esping-Andersen’s classiﬁ cation [1999: 40–43], three different types 
of social risks can be identiﬁ ed in Western Europe: class-based risks, life-course 
risks, and intergenerational risks. While class-based risks are primarily concerned 
with the uneven distribution of risks between social classes, life-course risks in-
volve the uneven distribution of risks over the entire life of the individual. Inter-
generational risks, by contrast, are more directly concerned with the intergenera-
tional transmission and inheritance of chances and associated hazards. An exam-
ple of class-based risks is the threat of unemployment faced by people in poorer 
social strata owing to their obsolete training and/or skills, whereas life-course 
risks include growing poverty for the elderly or for younger generations. Finally, 
intergenerational risks include the possibility that the sons of the unemployed 
will face a greater chance of becoming unemployed themselves. An alternative, 
but not very dissimilar model proposed by Kitschelt and Rehm [2006] differenti-
ates NSRs in terms of general existential risks (risks connected with the inability 
to work owing to illness or old age), group-speciﬁ c risks I (the obsolescence of 
skills as a result of structural changes), group-speciﬁ c risks II (uncertain returns 
in higher education, e.g. in speciﬁ c academic ﬁ elds) and group-speciﬁ c risks III: 
demographic risks (loss of earnings as a result of demographic reproduction; for 
example, raising children). 
Regardless of which type of classiﬁ cation is used, an important question 
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that still has to be clariﬁ ed involves the fact of whether these NSR types in the 
West are similar to the NSR types in Eastern Europe. In fact, although de-indus-
trialisation and the tertiarisation of employment is occurring both in the West and 
the East, the social changes associated with restructuring the centrally planned 
economy and the fast emergence of a new social structure no longer based on 
central planning are phenomena that mainly exist in Eastern European societies. 
Moreover, while the entry of women into the labour market can be addressed 
as a possible threat to already existing equilibriums in Western labour markets, 
this is certainly not the case of post-communist countries, where the employment 
structure already typically had higher levels of female employment. Instead, as 
will be seen below, the new challenge that post-communist societies are required 
to face in this area of social protection, it seems, is not a farewell to maternalism, 
to use Orloff’s expression [Orloff 2006], but rather the establishment of new and 
different forms of refamilisation, in which women are required to fulﬁ l the social 
and economic function of wives, mothers, workers, and care-givers in a new and 
substantially less secure market economy.
In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, in addition to the NSR types 
that exist in Western societies, there are also speciﬁ c, ‘past-dependent’, property-
related social risks. They originate in the restructuring of the centrally planned 
economy and in the subsequent changes occurring in the social structure. Here, 
the term ‘property’ should be understood in the broadest possible sense, to in-
clude not just material capital (such as the ownership of property assets), but 
also cultural capital (such as the impossibility of transforming educational skills 
developed for the communist system into skills that can be used in the post-com-
munist environment), and social capital (such as the capacity to develop or to be 
part of post-communist social networks) [see Bourdieu 1983]. 
These distinctions are far from being irrelevant, because in the new, uniﬁ ed, 
European, knowledge-based society, not only does the competition between peo-
ple become stronger (the transnational mobility of highly skilled workers from 
less developed European regions allegedly creates a race to the bottom in terms 
of wages but also a race to the top in terms of qualiﬁ cations), but also new and 
more diversiﬁ ed skills (material, cultural, and social) are required in order to suc-
cessfully compete in the new economic and social environment.
Government responses to NSRs
In terms of government responses to old and new social risks, these can, very 
brieﬂ y, be summarised in terms of welfare reforms aiming at: 1) the privatisa-
tion of provisions; 2) the individualisation of risks; 3) the monetisation of access; 
and 4) the decentralisation of management. These four main trends have taken the 
form of reintroducing (or strengthening) the social insurance principle into the 
social security system, the privatisation and differentiation of beneﬁ ts in the pen-
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sion sector, the dissolution of the Semashko health-care model coupled with the 
introduction of a decentralised public/private mix of health-care facilities, the es-
tablishment (in the majority of cases) of a three-pillar system of protection against 
unemployment consisting of unemployment beneﬁ ts, unemployment assistance, 
and social assistance, a redeﬁ nition towards the bottom of the excessive beneﬁ ts 
and entitlements provided under communism in the family policy sector, and the 
introduction of a basic safety net for the poorest social strata. This has correspond-
ed with a shift from universalistic to status maintenance aspirations, with result-
ing increases in poverty and income inequality [see Cerami 2006; OECD 2008].
Additional welfare reforms aimed at targeting NSRs more speciﬁ cally have 
also been found in the region. In the employment sector these reforms have taken 
the form of an increasing use of activation measures; in the family policy sector, 
a reduction in child care and maternity leaves – associated, however, with the 
establishment of paternal leave and the ﬁ rst laws for long-term care;5 and ﬁ nally, 
in the sector of skills improvement, the ﬁ rst attempts at introducing vocational 
training or life-long learning. The impact of these reforms has varied from coun-
try to country, but the results are still far from satisfactory. Taking as a case study 
the activation policies implemented in the Czech Republic, the best performer 
5 Please note that until 1989 long-term care was solely the responsibility of families. When 
family support was not available, patients were ‘institutionalised’.
Table 6. Educational indicators (2007)
Persons with lowest 
education Life-long learning
Bulgaria 22.6 1.3
Czech Rep. 9.5 5.7
Estonia 10.9 7.0
Hungary 20.8 3.6
Latvia 15.0 7.1
Lithuania 11.1 5.3
Poland 13.7 5.1
Romania 25.0 1.3
Slovakia 10.9 3.9
Slovenia 18.2 14.8
EU 15 32.5 11.3
* Percentage of the population aged 25 to 64 having completed at most lower secondary 
education. 
Source: Eurostat 2008. Structural Indicators. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
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among CEE countries, Sirovátka [2006] has, for example, demonstrated that these 
policies have not always brought the effects they aspired to in terms of increas-
ing employability and reducing long-term unemployment. With regard to the 
still unresolved problem of balancing work and family responsibilities, in the 
absence of a coherent policy approach, the measures aimed at reducing excessive 
child-care provisions and maternity leave do not seem to have been successful in 
freeing women from their fourfold role of wives, mothers, workers and care-givers. 
Rather, they seem to have accentuated the demands on women from a pressing 
labour market; a situation compounded by decreased family stability and poorer 
household composition [Kwak and Pascall 2005]. Finally, as far as the important 
issue of improving the obsolete skills of individuals is concerned, Table 6 shows 
that, even though Eastern Europeans have higher educational attainments than 
their Western counterparts, they are also less involved in vocational training, or 
life-long learning, and this in spite of the fact that these two measures would be 
vital in the process of economic and social transformation.
The new political economy of skill formation and the new empowering 
politics of the welfare state 
As outlined in the sections of above, the changes in society and the economy 
associated with the reform of the welfare state have resulted in the emergence 
of speciﬁ c NSRs that still need adequate government responses. The following 
section addresses this issue and discusses why a new political economy of skill 
formation [see Vanhuysse 2008a] seems to be necessary and what the constituting 
elements of a new empowering politics of the welfare state could be that would 
be capable of strengthening the potential of individuals to adapt to more ﬂ exible 
labour markets. 
A new political economy of skill formation6
Being successful in the knowledge-based economy requires the development 
of new and substantially different skills than those promoted during the trente 
glorieuses of the welfare state. The political economy of skill formation that has 
characterised the post-war period has been centred on supporting individuals 
in a stable labour market. Iversen and Stephens [2008] have distinguished three 
distinct worlds of human capital formation in the post-war Western Europe. The 
Social Democratic skill production regime has focused on redistribution and 
heavy investment in public education and industry-speciﬁ c and occupation-spe-
ciﬁ c vocational skills. The Christian Democratic skill production regime has been 
6 This section greatly beneﬁ ted from a discussion with Pieter Vanhuysse, to whom the 
author is greatly indebted.
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oriented towards high social insurance and vocational training in ﬁ rm-speciﬁ c 
and industry-speciﬁ c skills but less spending on public education. The Liberal 
regime of skill production typically involves heavy private investment in general 
skills but modest spending on public education and redistribution. Iversen and 
Stephens [2008] trace these three worlds to historical differences in the organisa-
tion of capitalism, electoral institutions, and partisan politics, emphasising not 
just the distinct character of political coalition formation behind each of the three 
models, but also the different performances in terms of inequality and labour 
market stratiﬁ cation. The authors’ analysis does not include the Communist skill 
production regime, but arguably its key characteristics would resemble those of 
Social Democratic skill production, with high redistribution and heavy invest-
ment in public education, and an overemphasis on industry-speciﬁ c compulsory 
skills at the expense of non-strategic occupational skills. Consequently, in the 
Communist skill production regime, market stratiﬁ cation was characterised by 
an abnormal homogeneity in human capital formation, which was able to sus-
tain the economy while ensuring relatively low levels of social inequality only 
through the redistributive capacity of central planning.
By contrast, in the new post-industrial, knowledge-based, and service 
economy, not only a well-educated, better-trained, more diversiﬁ ed, and service-
oriented work-force is necessary, but individuals are also called on to adapt to 
more ﬂ exible and less secure labour markets. A constant increase in atypical or 
non-standard forms of work, with the associated increasing wage gaps, is a real-
ity that can no longer be concealed. As highlighted by the recent OECD report 
Growing Unequal, not just GDP has grown in advanced industrialised economies 
since the 1980s, but new forms of poverty and income inequality have also been 
rising [OECD 2008]. As discussed in more detail below, this imbalance between 
economic growth and redistribution in a different market environment calls for a 
new politics of social security, which has to be associated with a new, more sys-
tematic and better adapted political economy of skill formation [see Vanhuysse 
2008a] capable of improving the learning skills and adaptation of individuals 
to the new labour market requirements. In fact, if Iversen and Stephens’ [2008] 
considerations were applied to the Post-communist skill production regime, then 
the result would be a hybrid regime made of an unclear mix of the four models 
mentioned above (high social insurance, modest public investments in education, 
increasing reliance of private investments in industry-speciﬁ c and occupation-
speciﬁ c skills coupled with high distributive aspirations but growing levels of 
social inequality), but still not suited for the new post-communist environment.
With respect to the changes occurring in household and family composi-
tion, new and different forms of human capital, no longer based on traditional 
family patterns, should also be developed. The assumption of stable couples with 
long-term and secure jobs is no longer valid, and the increase in single-headed 
households, divorces, women working part-time, and young people with atypi-
cal jobs demand new means of integration through new public policy instru-
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ments and through the development of new and more suitable skills. Households 
with NSR groups are more at risk of poverty and income inequality, and new and 
more severe forms of social reproduction of poverty and inequalities, with the 
subsequent transmission of poverty to children, are also on the rise. In this con-
text, child poverty, a major problem in all Western economies [see OECD 2008], 
but also in CEE countries [see LIS Key Figures 2008], has several harmful effects. 
Children from poor families experience not only more difﬁ culties at school but 
also more difﬁ culties in later stages of life, such as difﬁ culties ﬁ nding a well-paid 
job in an ever more demanding labour market or difﬁ culties connected with so-
cial inclusion or achieving personal happiness. In this context, improving the hu-
man capital and income status of parents is a crucial response in order to reduce 
the negative effects of the social reproduction of poverty [Heckman and Krueger 
2003; Esping-Andersen 2007, 2008].
Finally, with regard to the individualisation of responsibilities and risks, a 
new political economy of skill formation would seem a necessary precondition 
for dealing more successfully with the increased demands stemming from de-
regulated labour markets. Here, fostering the independence and autonomous in-
tegration of individuals in society as a whole should be seen as a policy priority, 
while the development of human capital (especially social and cultural capital) 
should constitute a key element of policy in order to bring people out of poverty 
[Sirovátka and Mareš 2008]. 
The new empowering politics of the welfare state
A new political economy of skill formation is in this context an essential prerequi-
site if CEE citizens are to adapt to the requirements of the knowledge-based soci-
ety, but this is still not enough to ensure adaptation and coverage in a substantially 
different and more insecure labour market. Also important is the introduction of 
‘new empowering politics’ into the welfare state. Welfare policies are useful for 
helping people out of extreme poverty, but they also fulﬁ l an important function 
as ‘institutional complementarities’ [Hall and Soskice 2001] of the capitalist sys-
tem. By providing education and training in those sectors of the economy where 
private investments would be too expensive and less remunerative, they help, for 
example, employers to ﬁ nd an adequately trained work force in the labour market 
[Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005; Iversen and Stephens 
2008; Vanhuysse 2008a]. However, a redeﬁ nition of the main redistributive priori-
ties of the welfare state is necessary and with it a recalibration of its main norms, 
institutional structures, and functions [Hemerijck 2008]. This clearly means the in-
troduction of new and more speciﬁ c policy instruments and political discourses. 
At a more practical policy level, linking the debate on ‘skill production re-
gimes’ [see Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005; Iversen 
and Stephens 2008; Vanhuysse 2008a] to the debate on the ‘social investment 
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state’ [see Atkinson 2002; Esping-Andersen and Palier 2008; Hemerijck 2008; 
Hinrichs 2008; Vanhuysse 2008a], it is possible to envisage four core elements 
in the new empowering politics of the welfare state. These four pillars would 
correspond to: 1) a guaranteed minimum income for vulnerable groups in soci-
ety; 2) a basic income for children; 3) state investments for education and human 
capital formation; and 4) a guaranteed tax-ﬁ nanced basic pension coupled with 
an earnings-related account for the elderly. With regard to the ﬁ rst pillar, leaving 
aside the debate of whether a minimum subsistence level should be provided 
to all citizens regardless (i.e. a basic income) or after means-testing (guaranteed 
minimum income),7 the establishment of minimum income schemes seems to be 
an important policy instrument, which on the one hand can protect the most vul-
nerable groups in society from poverty and income inequality, and on the other 
hand can provide them with a concrete opportunity for self-advancement. In 
contrast to the ‘old politics of the welfare state’, the main goal here would be not 
simply to shield citizens from the effects of the temporary negative performance 
of markets (a poverty alleviation strategy), but rather to detach individuals from 
the risks associated with more deregulated, less protective and redistributive la-
bour markets. To put it clearly, in this pillar, the welfare state’s new empower-
ing politics would empower through de-commodiﬁ cation [see Esping-Andersen 
1990; Atkinson 2002]. The second pillar of the new empowering politics could 
consist of a basic income for children to protect them from increasing poverty, 
while enabling parents to invest more time in the labour market and in their chil-
dren’s development [see Esping-Andersen 2008]. In this pillar, empowerment is 
achieved through childhood investment. The third pillar of the new empowering 
politics of the welfare state should, as a consequence, consist of measures aimed 
at increasing the human capital of citizens through state investments in education 
and human capital formation. This would not only be beneﬁ cial to individuals, 
to help them cope with the individualisation and monetisation of risks in a more 
effective manner, but would also generate new and more suitable skills to be em-
ployed in the knowledge-based economy [see Esping-Andersen 2007; Esping-An-
dersen and Palier 2008; Hemerijck 2008]. In this pillar, empowerment is achieved 
through human capital formation. Finally, the fourth pillar of the welfare state’s 
new empowering politics would consist of a basic income pension, tax ﬁ nanced 
and available on a universal basis, and associated with an earnings-related ac-
count (eventually privately managed) for the working population. This scheme 
would ensure professional diversity at the top of the income classes, and it would 
also redistribute life risks in a more balanced way through the entire course of 
an individual’s existence (for an interesting analysis, see Hinrichs [2008]). In this 
pillar, empowerment is derived from the rebalancing of life risks. Are these new 
empowering politics a feasible political option for the welfare state?
7 This is certainly not an irrelevant distinction, but it goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
For more information on the key characteristics of basic income, see documents available 
at Basic Income Earth Network http://www.basicincome.org/bien/.
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The new empowering politics of the welfare state, political coalitions and voter 
preferences
In order to make the new empowering politics a feasible option, the main logic in 
social policy needs to be reconsidered. In the knowledge-based economy, social 
policy spending can no longer be seen as a burden to economic development, 
but rather as an investment aimed at improving adaptation to the labour market. 
Returns from this type of ‘social investment’ would in fact be extremely large 
[Esping-Andersen and Palier 2008; Hemerijck 2008]. For example, as argued by 
Esping-Andersen and Palier [2008], workers better adapted to the labour force 
could ultimately pay more overall in taxes, the labour market could draw on a 
better-trained workforce, and the productivity of employees would increase.
In terms of voter preferences, the introduction of the new empowering 
politics would also be a viable option, provided that new political discourses 
[Schmidt 2008] are developed. In fact, as highlighted by Iversen [2005] and Van-
huysse [2008a], welfare policies aiming at producing new skills and at targeting 
thus far unprotected groups of citizens can be proﬁ table for individuals, ﬁ rms, 
markets, and even politicians. In European history (but also elsewhere), not only 
has skill speciﬁ city (together with income the best predictors of voter preferences 
on welfare issues) resulted in the formation of particular political coalitions, but 
these have also in many cases been able to inﬂ uence party politics on speciﬁ c 
issues (e.g. pensioners’ associations, or blue-collar or atypical workers) [Bonoli 
2007]. CEE societies have so far been characterised by less effective union elites 
and less politically mobilised NSR groups than those present in the West [Ost 
2005; Vanhuysse 2006, 2007, 2008b]. But this does not necessarily mean that the 
requests coming from these groups of citizens will diminish or that they will 
continue to have little impact on future welfare state reforms. An emblematic 
example of how NSR constituencies can block reforms is provided by the protests 
in the Russian Federation following Putin’s attempts to replace in-kind beneﬁ ts 
with cash beneﬁ ts (the ‘monetisation’ of beneﬁ ts). These protests were started 
in the streets of Moscow and St. Petersburg in January 2005 by associations of 
pensioners and poor income groups, and resulted, a few weeks later, in unprec-
edented obstruction in the Duma [Cerami 2009]. In the eyes of many observers, 
these protests and obstruction in the Duma were in fact to be expected, since 
these reforms would have substantially reduced the role of the Russian welfare 
state, especially as beneﬁ ting the most vulnerable categories. The formation of 
NSR coalitions was therefore the predictable outcome of tabling policies target-
ing speciﬁ c categories of previously unheard of constituencies.
Conclusion
This article highlighted the drastic economic and social changes that have been 
occurring in post-communist societies. It was argued that the fast transformation 
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of CEE societies towards becoming post-industrial, knowledge-based, service 
economies has resulted in the emergence of completely new factors of risks than 
those present during communism. New forms of social exclusion have emerged 
as a result of new and different patterns of poverty and income inequality. Un-
certainties surrounding pensions, health care, employment, basic income, fam-
ily policies and educational opportunities have compounded a situation already 
made difﬁ cult by the negative economic consequences of transition. For Western 
welfare states these are the ‘old’ social risks that must be dealt with, but in East-
ern Europe they must be regarded as new. The already long list of social risks in 
CEE societies, involving difﬁ culties in reconciling labour market ﬂ exibility with 
social and economic security, in balancing work and family responsibilities, and 
in ensuring care for the elderly, the ill, or handicapped parents, has grown with 
the emergence of the ‘new’ social risks typical for Western Europe. 
Government responses to old and new social risks in the form of welfare 
reforms aimed at privatising welfare provisions, individualising risks, and mon-
etising access to beneﬁ ts, while decentralising the management of the social se-
curity system, do not seem to have properly addressed the problems that Eastern 
European citizens are facing. This is primarily because of the existence of a po-
litical economy of skill formation particularly suited for the ‘golden age’ of the 
welfare state and centred on supporting individuals in a stable labour market. In 
the new post-industrial, knowledge-based, service economy, not only a well-edu-
cated, better trained, more diversiﬁ ed, and service-oriented work-force is neces-
sary, but individuals are also called on to adapt to more ﬂ exible and less secure 
labour markets. 
So far, the political economy of skill formation that has characterised the 
post-communist transition (the Post-communist skill production regime) has 
been characterised by an ambiguous mix of high social insurance premiums, 
modest public investments in education, and the increasing reliance on private 
investments into industry-speciﬁ c and occupation-speciﬁ c skills, associated, 
however, with high distributive aspirations but growing levels of social inequal-
ity. A new political economy of skill formation would, in this context, represent a 
useful policy instrument, but this would still not be enough to ensure adaptation 
and coverage in a substantially different and more insecure labour market. The 
introduction of a new empowering politics of the welfare state is also important 
here. Welfare policies are crucial for protecting people from poverty and they 
represent important institutional complementarities [see Hall and Soskice 2001] 
of the capitalist system. 
The welfare state’s ‘new empowering politics’ would consist of four basic 
pillars 1) a guaranteed minimum income; 2) a basic income for children; 3) state 
investments into education and human capital formation; and 4) a guaranteed ba-
sic pension, which would be aimed at, on the one hand, increasing each individu-
al’s human capital, and on the other hand, favouring the inclusion, coverage, and 
more equal distribution of risks over the entire life course of the individual [see 
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Esping-Andersen and Palier 2008; Hemerijck 2008]. In contrast to the ‘old politics 
of the welfare state’, the main goal here would not simply be to help protect citi-
zens from negative effects when markets perform poorly (a poverty alleviation 
strategy) or to ensure status maintenance under conditions of increasing ﬁ scal 
constraints (a social reproduction strategy) but rather to separate individuals from 
the risks associated with more deregulated and less protective and redistributive 
labour markets while empowering their adaptation to the new knowledge-based 
society. To put it brieﬂ y, through these four main pillars the new empowering 
politics of the welfare state would: 1) empower through de-commodiﬁ cation; 
2) empower through childhood investment; 3) empower through human capital 
formation; and 4) empower through the rebalancing of life risks.
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The Environmentally Friendly Lifestyle: 
Simple or Complicated?*
HANA LIBROVÁ**
Masaryk University, Brno
Abstract: Simplicity is generally considered an important characteristic of the 
environmentally friendly lifestyle. This article questions this tenet. Nine di-
mensions of simplicity are proposed: non-ownership, lack of power, aesthetics, 
behaviour, naturalness, freedom of movement, the sedentary life/faithfulness 
to a place, education, and living lightly. Using these categories, the question is 
asked whether the cultural stereotype of simplicity corresponds to reality. The 
images of the environmentally friendly lifestyles are analysed from an every-
day perspective, including radical forms of self-sufﬁ ciency. The result is a con-
clusion contrary to the common belief: while the life of the typical consumerist 
is simple, the life of environmental virtue is complex. This ﬁ nding directs at-
tention to one part of N. Elias’ sociological theory, which understands the civi-
lisation process as the replacement of simple behaviour with complex rituals. 
Keywords: environmentally friendly lifestyle, voluntary simplicity, nine di-
mensions of simplicity, self-sufﬁ ciency
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An alternative, or a post-modern dream?
When we read books advocating ecologically friendly lifestyles or peruse envi-
ronmental journals, we soon notice that some words recur often. For example, the 
word ‘simple’, which is used especially in the expression ‘voluntary simplicity’, a 
term coined by Richard B. Gregg, a British disciple of Mahatma Gandhi, in the es-
say The Value of Voluntary Simplicity [1936]. ‘Simplicity’ is such an important word 
in the environmental context that authors even place it in the titles of their books, 
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Hesitant: Chapters on Ecological Luxury’, published in 2003 by Doplněk Publishers, Brno, 
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‘Individualisation of Lifestyles in an Environmental Perspective’. The author would like 
to thank Lukáš Kala, an MA student in Environmental Humanities, for his technical help 
with manuscript preparation. 
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